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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT REGARDING THE ISSUES 
Appellees object for the following reasons to appellant's ability to appeal Issue 
Number 1, and to the standard of review it suggests for each Issue. 
Issue No. 1: Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) requires that an 
appellant include in its statement of issues a "citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court." This reflects the basic rule that to preserve an issue for 
appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial court. See, e.g., DeBry v. 
Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1984). 
Appellant failed to raise before the trial court its argument that it was entitled to 
summary judgment due to the failure of appellee, Thrifty Payless, Inc. d/b/a Rite Aid 
("Rite Aid"), to respond to appellant's summary judgment motion. Appellant is therefore 
barred from raising that issue for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this Court should decide to address the issue, which Rite Aid addresses on 
the merits in the body of its brief, the standard of review is the same standard required of 
the trial court in deciding summary judgment motions: This Court should view the facts 
in the light most likely to create factual questions. See, e.g., Estate Landscaping & Snow 
Removal v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992). 
Issue No. 2: In defining this issue, Hillside basically argues that Rite Aid's 
exercise of its Option was contrary to the Lease as modified by later correspondence. To 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
the extent Hillside challenges the trial court's reading of written documents, the issue 
presents a question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. See, e.g., Harris v. IES 
Assocs. Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, f 27, 69 P.3d 297. 
To the extent, however, that this Court "must rely on facts deduced from 
testimony, [it defers] to the trial court's relevant findings of fact, by applying the clearly 
erroneous standard of review, and resolve[s] any ambiguities in the evidence in favor of 
the trial court's judgment." Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 
931 (Utah 1993). 
Issue No. 3: The issue here is not what the words of the Lease say, which would 
involve a "correctness" standard of review. Instead, the question in Issue No. 3 is 
whether equity should excuse Rite Aid's mistake in interpreting the change of address 
notice, assuming that the Court finds during its analysis of Issue No. 2 that Rite Aid did 
indeed make a mistake. See U.S. Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security Inv., Ltd., 2002 UT 14, f^ 
10, 40 P.3d 586 (" U.S. Realty now appeals, contending that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law by refusing to equitably excuse it from strict compliance . . ."); Utah Coal 
and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoors Adventures Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ^ 10, 40 
P.3d 581 ("The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in equitably 
excusing White Pine's failure to timely exercise its lease renewal option."); Geisdorfv. 
Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998) ("[T]here are instances in which deviation from 
strict compliance [with lease renewal provisions] may be equitably excused."). 
Appellant erroneously claims that this issue is subject to a "correctness" standard 
of review. To the contrary, the US. Realty 86 opinion makes clear that the issue of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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equitable excuse constitutes a mixed question of law and fact. In such cases, courts 
"grant broadened discretion to the findings of the trial court." U.S. Realty 86, 2002 UT 
14, Tf 12 (emphasis added). As a consequence, the Court reviews this issue for abuse of 
discretion: 
The application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable estoppel is a 
mixed question of fact and law. . . . Consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's standard of review on the issue of waiver, we grant similar 
broadened discretion to the trial court on the issue of equitable estoppel. 
* * * 
We assume that this overall view of the interaction between the parties led 
the trial court to reject appellants' argument of equitable estoppel. We find 
that it was within the trial court's discretion to so conclude. Accordingly, 
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this issue, and 
affirm the trial court's determination that the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
does not apply in this instance. 
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
Issue No. 4: The interpretation of a contract to determine whether attorney fees are 
recoverable is a question of law. See, e.g., Zions First Natl Bank, N.A. v. National Am. 
Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,656 (Utah 1988). It is only the amount of the award that this 
Court reviews for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 
P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
None. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a contract dispute involving the question of whether Rite Aid, as tenant, 
effectively exercised its Option to renew a commercial lease agreement with appellant, 
Hillside Plaza Ltd. d/b/a/ Hillside Plaza Properties ("Hillside"). During the initial lease 
term, both parties amended the lease by providing alternate mailing addresses. Rite Aid 
exercised its renewal Option by sending written notice by certified mail to Hillside at the 
most recent address it had for legal notices. Hillside maintains that Rite Aid should have 
sent its renewal notice to Hillside Management, Hillside's property manager, at a 
different address, and that Rite Aid's failure to do so made the renewal untimely and 
ineffective. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Rite Aid filed a complaint in this action on December 14, 2000 requesting the trial 
court to declare that (1) Rite Aid effectively exercised its Option by mailing its notice of 
renewal to the correct address; or (2) if Rite Aid did not mail its notice of renewal to the 
correct address, any error was equitably excused as the result of an honest and justifiable 
mistake. The trial court denied cross motions for summary judgment submitted by the 
parties, and after a bench trial entered judgment for Rite Aid. 
III. STATEMENT REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
RELEVANT FACTS 
In the Statement of Facts in its initial brief, Hillside curiously cites its own 
proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, rather than the findings and 
conclusions the trial court actually signed and entered, included herein as Addendum A. 
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As a consequence, Hillside claims that the trial court made several findings that it in fact 
did not make. These include the findings Hillside has numbered in its initial brief as 
findings 13, 14, 21, 30 and 34-43 (R. 975-987). 
At the same time Hillside includes 14 "findings" that the trial court refused to 
make, Hillside omitted 19 findings that the trial court made and entered. Rite Aid 
reproduces these omitted findings verbatim below: 
25. At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that Hillside ever 
sent the January 21, 1997 Letter to Rite Aid or anyone else (R. 981). 
26. Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or justifying 
Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial (R.981). 
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements 
28. In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to change the 
mailing address for all purposes from [CPMC] to Hillside Management; 
Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention (R. 981). 
29. Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August 4, 2000, 
the deadline for Rite Aid's Option exercise (R. 981-82). 
30. Because it changed the address for legal notice only on its PIMS 
system, leaving the address for other correspondence unchanged, it is clear 
that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest read Exhibit 3 as changing the 
address for rent and rent-related activities only, leaving unaffected the 
address contained in Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and 
rent-related activities (R. 982). 
33. The phrase "property management" may or may not mean "all" 
activities involving the managed property (R. 982). 
34. Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really small moment 
whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to sending Exhibit 5, because 
Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the address for "rent", and not to other 
types of correspondence, and therefore changed the address for rent only 
(R.982). 
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I 
35. Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only the address 
for rent and rent-related correspondence was reasonable (R. 982). 
1 
36. Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid should be 
charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's unexpressed 
intent (R. 983). 
37. It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management to have j 
written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed the address for all 
types of notice; indeed its purported January 21, 1997 letter accomplished 
that purpose (R. 983). 
38. The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that it \ 
repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy post office 
box address because such correspondence was rent-related, and in many 
cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit monies to the listed address (R. 
983). 
39. To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the address it was 
using, Hillside provided no explanation of its failure ever to send any 
change of address notice to Rite Aid at the address it had specified in 
Exhibit 4 as applying to legal notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box 
3165, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) (R. 983). < 
Mistake 
40. Alternatively, Rite Aid interpreted Exhibit 3 in a manner 
inconsistent with Hillside Management's intention (R. 983-84).
 t 
41. Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3 (R. 984). 
42. The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only with urent" or 
"rental" (R. 984). 
43. Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion inherent in 
Exhibit 3 (R. 984). 
44. It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge Rite Aid with 
knowledge of what was in Hillside Management's mind (R. 984). 
45. To the extent that Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong address, 
that error was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake in interpreting 
Exhibit 3 (R. 984). 
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46. No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in exercising 
the Option to renew the Lease (R. 984). 
In summary, Hillside's purported "findings" nos. 13, 14, 21, 30 and 34-42 are 
arguments, not findings. The trial court neither accepted nor entered any of those 
"findings". In fact, it rejected them. 
On the other hand, the trial court expressly found that (1) there was no evidence 
that Hillside Management ever sent the January 21, 1997 letter included in Exhibit 55 to 
anyone (Finding 25); (2) Exhibit 3 does not reveal Hillside Management's intent that all 
future legal notices be addressed to Hillside Management (Finding 28); (3) Rite Aid was 
unaware until after the expiration of the Option renewal date that Rite Aid was to send 
renewal notices to Hillside Management (Finding 29); (4) Rite Aid's reading of Exhibit 3 
was reasonable (Finding 35); (5) to the extent Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong 
address, that error was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake in interpreting 
Exhibit 3 (Finding 45); and (6) no trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in 
exercising its Option to renew the Lease. 
Nothing has become more settled in Utah appellate jurisprudence over the last 
decade than an appellant's duty to marshal evidence. If an appellant such as Hillside fails 
to marshal the evidence supporting each challenged finding, this Court accepts the 
finding as true and does not consider the appellant's argument. See, e.g. Lefavi v. 
Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, ^ 17, 994 P.2d 817 ("When an appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, we refiise to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the 
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( 
findings as valid.") (citation omitted). Hillside has failed to marshal the evidence not 
only on those critical findings, but generally on all the findings that Hillside challenges: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the [trial] court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Harris v. IESAssocs. Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, H 39. 
Instead of doing this, Hillside merely lists a few references to evidence for and 
against its position. This is not what the marshalling doctrine requires. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
During the course of the proceeding below, Hillside moved for summary 
judgment. The trial court denied summary judgment, as precluded by a genuine issue of a 
material fact. On appeal, Hillside raises, for the first time, an argument that the lower 
court should have granted its motion based on Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. This argument should not be considered for the first time here; however, 
if considered, the argument should fail because Rite Aid directly denied Hillside's 
"undisputed facts", creating a genuine factual dispute. 
Rite Aid effectively exercised its Option by sending Notice of Renewal to the 
correct address. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that Hillside's September 2, 
1996 change of address letter is unambiguous. The trial court further found, as a matter of 
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fact, that the letter limits the change of address notice to rent payments. The text of the 
letter states: "Please mail your future rent payments as follows: . . ." Rite Aid correctly 
interpreted this letter as applying only to rent payments and rent-related correspondence. 
Consequently, Rite Aid effectively exercised its Option by sending its Notice of Lease 
Renewal to the address it had on file for legal notices, rather than the address provided 
for rent payments. Based on its own text, the September 2, 1996 letter is unambiguous. 
As a result, this Court should conclude that Rite Aid strictly complied with the Lease. 
If this Court determines that the September 2, 1996 letter is ambiguous, despite the 
clear language limiting its application to "rent payments", then the Court must determine 
whether the trial court committed clear error in finding that Rite Aid effectively exercised 
its Option. Because Hillside failed to comprehensively marshal the evidence on this issue, 
Hillside's challenge should fail. However, if the Court decides to address this issue, Rite 
Aid has provided relevant evidence. 
The evidence presented at trial, including documents and expert testimony, shows 
that Rite Aid reasonably interpreted Hillside's change of address notices as requiring the 
notice of renewal to be sent to CPMC. Specifically, the September 2, 1996 letter applied 
only to rent and rent-related correspondence. The letter from Hillside to Rite Aid's 
maintenance personnel was not effective notice to Rite Aid's legal counsel. And the 
correspondence included in Exhibit 55 was either excluded at trial for lack of 
authentication or unpersuasive as limited to rent or rent-related issues (e.g., tax notices). 
Consequently, even upon a finding of ambiguity, the evidence shows that Rite Aid 
strictly complied with the Lease requirements in exercising its Option to renew. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^ 
In addition to its finding of strict compliance, the trial court made an alternative 
conclusion: To the extent Rite Aid was mistaken in its interpretation of Exhibit 3, such i 
mistake is equitably excused. Utah Courts have excused failure to strictly comply with 
lease terms when a party has made an honest and justifiable mistake. Rite Aid's conduct 
1 
is analogous to the excusable conduct described in such opinions. Furthermore, where a 
party's interpretation is the same as the interpretation of a trial court, such a mistake must 
surely be reasonable and available for equitable excuse. 
Finally, Hillside challenges the attorney fee award. By refusing to recognize Rite 
Aid's notice of renewal, attempting to evict Rite Aid, and forcing Rite Aid to post a bond, 
Hillside breached the Lease. According to the terms of the Lease, as interpreted by this 
Court, Hillside, as the breaching party, is liable to Rite Aid for attorney fees. Hillside's 
arguments for an award reduction are unsupported by evidence or legal authority, and 
should consequently have no impact here. The trial court's award of attorney fees is both 
correct and reasonable. < 
ARGUMENT 
I. HILLSIDE WAS NOT, AND IS NOT, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 1 
Hillside contends at page 33 of Brief of Appellant that its summary judgment 
motion "contained a statement of undisputed facts dispositive to Hillside's case." An 
examination of the record shows that, to the contrary, Hillside's facts were dispositive of 
nothing. As a preliminary matter, however, this Court need not reach any of Hillside's 
arguments because they failed to raise them before the trial court. 
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A. Hillside Never Raised the Rule 4-501 Issue before the Trial Court 
Hillside never filed a pleading with the trial court, or otherwise argued, that the 
trial court was compelled to grant Hillside summary judgment according to Utah Rule of 
Judicial Administration 4-501. After Hillside filed its Notice to Submit (R. 474), it did 
not file a later pleading arguing to the trial court that Rule 4-501 required it to grant 
Hillside's summary judgment motion. 
To adequately preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant must have afforded the 
trial court the opportunity to rule on the issue. See, e.g., Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 
(Utah 1986). A trial court has the opportunity to rule only if the appellant has satisfied 
the following three requirements: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the 
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. The purpose of such requirements is to put the judge on notice 
of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of 
the proceeding. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
In other words, Hillside's failure to raise this issue to a "level of consciousness" 
before the lower court precludes Hillside from raising the issue now. See, e.g., Groberg 
v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, H 19, 68 P.3d 1015. 
Even if this Court decides to reach this issue notwithstanding Hillside's failure to 
bring its Rule 4-501 argument to the trial court's attention, Hillside's argument fails on 
its merits. 
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I 
B. This Court Should View the Facts in a Light Most Likely to Create 
Factual Questions 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the 
same standard that the trial court applied. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ]f 13, 70 P.3d 904 (Utah May 13, 2003). Accordingly, i 
"summary judgment is only appropriate where 'there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact . . .'" Id. In making that determination, courts "indulge all inferences and 
presumptions in favor of allowing the dispute to proceed to trial and consequently view 
the facts in the light most likely to create factual questions . . ." Estate Landscaping, 844 
P.2d at 324 n.l (emphasis added).1 Similarly, courts should "view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Smith, 2003 UT 23, If 2. , 
C. A Party Seeking Summary Judgment Has the Burden of Establishing 
All "Facts" By Competent Evidence; Until the Movant Does So, the 
Non-Moving Party Has No Duty to Respond 
Any party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing that it is entitled 
to summary judgment. See, e.g., Estate Landscaping, 844 P.2d at 324. To sustain its 
burden, Hillside needed to "clearly establish" its right to summary judgment. See, e.g.,
 i 
1
 Hillside cites Petersen v. Bd. of Educ. Of Davis County School Dist., 855 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1993) for the proposition that appellate courts review trial court summary judgment 
decisions "for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling." Petersen, 
however, had nothing to do with summary judgment. It reviewed a trial court's denial of 
a motion to dismiss, not a summary judgment motion. See id. at 242. By definition, no 
facts are in dispute in such a motion because the court accepts all averments as true. See, 
e.g., Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, % 7, 69 P.3d 286. 
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Smith 2003 UT 23, f^ 24. The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the operation of 
Hillside's and Rite Aid's respective burdens: 
Once the moving party has presented sufficient evidence to support the 
claim for judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-moving 
party to provide evidence creating an issue of material fact. . . . Therefore, 
when the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a 
judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary 
evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact 
is present or would be at trial. 
Id., f^ 40 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Indeed, at page 35 of its Brief of Appellant, Hillside itself concedes that Utah Rule 
of Judicial Administration 4-501 permits trial courts to grant summary judgment only if 
presented with "properly supported" facts. 
D. Hillside Did Not Prove the Absence of Factual Issues Regarding the 
January 21,1997 Letter on Which It So Heavily Relies 
On appeal, Hillside affords considerable weight to one single page in the middle of 
79 undifferentiated pages (R. 187-265) attached to John Johnson's February 6, 2001 
Affidavit (the "Johnson Affidavit") (R. 184-86). That single page (R. 218) is a purported 
January 21, 1997 letter from Annette Johnson to Thrifty Payless (the "Annette Johnson 
Letter"). Hillside argues at page 35 of its initial brief that, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Hillside's statement that it "sent" all 79 attached pages to Rite Aid is admitted as 
undisputed fact for the purpose of summary judgment. Hillside's reading of Rule 4-501 
is incorrect. 
Rule 4-501 states, in pertinent part: "All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
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admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement (emphasis added)". Hillside makes two errors in its < 
application of the rule to the facts at hand: (1) Hillside failed to properly support the 
assertion that it sent the letter; and (2) Rite Aid specifically controverted receipt of the 
i 
letter. 
1. Hillside Did Not "Properly Support" Its Naked Assertion That It 
"Sent" the Annette Johnson Letter to Rite Aid 
Hillside submitted, as Undisputed Fact Number 4, that "Hillside sent Rite Aid . . . 
seven separate written notices of property management's new and substituted address", 
including the Annette Johnson Letter (R. 361, ^ f 4) (emphasis added). Although Hillside * 
submitted copies of miscellaneous documents from its files, it did not "properly support" 
the statement that it "sent" the documents to Rite Aid with any competent evidence. 
Instead, Hillside merely cited the Johnson Affidavit to which the Annette Johnson Letter 
was attached - an affidavit which did not reference the Annette Johnson Letter, or in any 
way show that Hillside Management ever sent the Annette Johnson Letter to Rite Aid. 
In Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
this Court explained the proof necessary to establish mailing: \ 
[Litster] provides no direct evidence that the notice of claim allegedly 
mailed to the attorney general was ever prepared. [Litster's attorney] does 
not state that he dictated a letter addressed to the attorney, general, signed 
it, or gave it to his secretary. Nor do we have an affidavit from [Litster's < 
lawyer's] secretary that she typed a notice addressed to the attorney 
general. We do not even have direct evidence that [Litster's attorney's] 
secretary photocopied the letter addressed to [defendant] or placed it in an 
envelope addressed to the attorney general. 
Id. at 941. 
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This case is indistinguishable from Litster. Annette Johnson, the purported author 
and signer of the January 21, 1997 letter, never testified - in connection with the 
summary judgment, or at trial - that she prepared or signed the letter. There is no 
evidence that either Ms. Johnson or her secretary typed the letter. There is no evidence 
than Ms. Johnson or her secretary photocopied the letter or placed it in an envelope 
addressed to Thrifty Payless at the location shown on the letter. 
Moreover, Hillside downplayed the Annette Johnson letter in its summary 
judgment papers. Rite Aid ignored the letter into oblivion by placing it among 79 
undifferentiated pages in the Exhibit B attachment to the Johnson Affidavit, stating 
merely: "Attachment hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct summary of the 
correspondence between Rite Aid and Hillside from September 1996 to May 2000." (R. 
185, f 4).2 In contrast, the September 6, 1996 letter was the entirety of Exhibit "A" to the 
2
 Hillside also made only a cursory reference (R. 1078, p. 189:5-9) to the Annette Johnson Letter 
at trial. Hillside did not think enough of the letter even to give it its own exhibit number. When 
questioned by Hillside's own counsel, John Johnson said only that the copy of the Annette 
Johnson Letter "came out of our files" (R. 1078, p. 213:25). After the parties rested, the trial 
court expressed its puzzlement regarding Hillside's failure to present evidence that it prepared or 
mailed the Annette Johnson Letter: "No legitimate reason has [been] offered why Annette 
Johnson is not here to tell us why she wrote this letter, to tell us that she, in fact, did write it, that 
she in fact either recalls it being sent or it would have been sent because of the normal business 
practices. Mr. Johnson can't tell us that. The only [sic] he could tell us is he found it in the file. 
That does not create a presumption of mailing. The courts are clear on this. There has to be 
some direct evidence of either a course of conduct, a business practice or someone saying yes, I 
sent it. Then there's a presumption that it's received. But Hillside hasn't done that in this case 
and I thought maybe I ought to do something like order this case reopened or call as my own 
witness Ms. Johnson. But then I thought, you know, quit screwing around with this case, you're 
not the lawyer, decide the case on what you've got." (R. 1079 at 282:21-283:11) 
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-5 
Affidavit (R. 186-87). Furthermore, Hillside did not even refer to the letter in the order 
it prepared for the court denying Rite Aid's summary judgment motion.4 (R. 471-73). < 
In summary, Hillside failed to carry its burden of "properly supporting" its naked 
assertion that Hillside "sent" the seventy-nine pages of which the Annette Johnson letter 
was only one. 
2. Rite Aid "Specifically Controverted" Hillside's Claim That It Sent the 
Annette Johnson Letter 
Second, Rite Aid "specifically controverted" Hillside's assertion that it sent the 
Annette Johnson Letter by providing evidence that it was not in Rite Aid's lease file. 
In its argument, Hillside relies on Undisputed Fact Number 4 offered in the 
memorandum opposing Rite Aid's summary judgment motion and supporting Hillside's 
own summary judgment motion (R. 355-434). Rite Aid responded to this "undisputed , 
fact" in the reply memorandum supporting its own motion (R. 438-468) with one word: 
"Deny" (R. 441). 
i 
Then, after unequivocally denying the very fact Hillside now claims Rite Aid 
never denied, Rite Aid went on to explain its denial: "The January 27, 1997 letter to Lu 
1 
3
 The divider page captioned "Exhibit 'A'" and the first page of the September 2, 1996 letter are 
not paginated in the record. 
4
 In numbered paragraph one of that order, Hillside's counsel made clear that it did not 
rely on the Annette Johnson Letter to resist Rite Aid's summary judgment motion: "The 
Court finds that Rite Aid's (and its predecessor's) conduct during the four-year period 
after receipt of the September 2, 1996 letter [Ex. 3] raises genuine issues as to material 
facts, precluding summary judgment in favor of Rite Aid" (R. 471). 
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Strong [the Annette Johnson Letter] is not in Rite Aid's lease file. See Gelman 
Deposition at 42-43." (R. 441). 
Viewing the evidence in a light most likely to create factual questions, this Court 
should find that (1) Hillside failed to properly support the statement that it sent the 
Annette Johnson Letter to Rite Aid, and (2) Rite Aid specifically controverted the 
statement. Because, Hillside failed to meet the burden imposed by Rule 4-501, it would 
have been error for the trial court to grant Hillside's summary judgment motion. 
H. RITE AID PROPERLY INTERPRETED HILLSIDE'S SEPTEMBER 
2,1996 LETTER (EXHIBIT 3) AS CHANGING THE ADDRESS 
ONLY FOR RENT AND RENT-RELATED CORRESPONDENCE; 
RITE AID TIMELY SENT ITS RENEWAL NOTICE TO THE 
CORRECT ADDRESS 
In its Statement Regarding the Issues, supra at 1, Rite Aid showed that the 
standard of review of this second issue is correctness if the relevant writings are 
unambiguous, or clearly erroneous if the Court should find it must examine "facts 
deduced from testimony". Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d at 931. 
An ambiguity exists where language "is reasonably capable of being understood in 
more than one sense." R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 
(Utah 1997). Whether a document or writing is ambiguous is a question of law. See, 
e.g., Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Sprouse v. Jager, 806 
P.2d 219-220-221 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A. The Trial Court Found Exhibit 3 to Be Unambiguous 
The trial court entered the following conclusions on this issue: 
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t 
6. The effectiveness of Exhibit 5 to exercise Rite Aid's Option to 
renew the Lease therefore rises or falls with Exhibit 3. 
< 
13. Exhibit 3 is not ambiguous. It says send rent payments to the new 
address. Rite Aid did that. 
R. 977,979. 
Thus, the first issue this Court must address is the correctness of (1) the trial 
court's conclusion that Exhibit 3 is unambiguous, and (2) its reading of Exhibit 3. This 
requires an examination of Exhibits 2 and 3, included herein as Addenda B and C. \ 
1. Exhibit 2 Sets the State for Exhibit 3 by Providing a Change of 
Address for All Mail 
On March 19, 1992 Commerce Properties Management Corporation ("CPMC"),
 ( 
Hillside's property manager at the time, sent a form letter to Rite Aid's predecessor in 
interest. (Ex. 2, R. 978 % 11, 1077 at 39) That March 19, 1992 letter gave Rite Aid's 
predecessor the following notice: 
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and other mail to 
our former address. Effective March 20, 1992 our brokerage company is 
moving from their location at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In i 
the future all rental payments and mail for [CPMC] should be addressed as 
follows: 
Hillside Plaza Limited 
Commerce Properties Management Corp. i 
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Ex. 2 (emphasis added). 
• I 
There is no dispute that Rite Aid's predecessor received Exhibit 2 and that it put 
Exhibit 2 in the permanent Lease file. 
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2. Hillside Management Sends Exhibit 3, Providing a Change of Address 
for Rent Payments Only 
On September 2, 1996 Hillside Management sent a form letter (Ex. 3, R. 978-79 f 
12) to Rite Aid's predecessor. Exhibit 3 provided the following notice: 
For the month of September, 1996, [CPMC] will forward your rental payment to 
Hillside Management. Please mail your future rent payments as follows: 
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center 
c/o Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, Utah 84090 
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with the terms of your lease 
and must be received no later than the date specified in your lease. 
Ex. 3 (emphasis added). 
The trial court explained the difference between the two letters: "Unlike Exhibit 2, 
Exhibit 3 gave no change of address instructions for "mail" or "other mail". It expressly 
limited the address change to "rent" and "rental" payments." (Finding 14, R. 979, | 14) 
(emphasis added). 
3. The Dispute before This Court Is Whether Rite Aid Sent its Notice of 
Renewal to the Correct Address 
The Lease (Ex. 51), included herein as Addendum D, provides, at J^ (1): 
The preliminary term of this Lease shall commence with the date of this 
Lease [May 6, 1974] and extend until the date of the commencement of the 
original term as defined in the article of the Lease Agreement entitled 
"COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." The original term of this 
Lease [the "Original Term"] shall commence upon the expiration of said 
preliminary term and shall expire at midnight on January 31 following the 
expiration of twenty-five (25) years from the commencement of original 
term. 
(R. 9804 19). 
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i 
The Original Term of the Lease commenced on October 6, 1975. Accordingly the 
Original Term ended at midnight, January 31, 2001. (Ex. 51). < 
The Lease further provides, at ]f (2): 
OPTION TO EXTEND [the "Option"]: Tenant, at its option may extend 
the term of this Lease for not to exceed four separate and additional * 
consecutive periods of 5 years each. Each such extension shall be exercised 
by giving written notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the expiration 
of the original term hereof or any such extended term. Upon such exercise, 
this Lease and the Lease Agreement shall be deemed to be extended 
without the execution or any further lease of other instrument. 
(Ex.51). 
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite Aid's exercise 
of the Option, and renewal not later than August 4, 2000, the date 180 days before 
January 31, 2002. 
Accordingly, on June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via certified mail, return receipt { 
requested, its notice of renewal of the Lease to the most recent address it had for general 
mail to its landlord, and the same address it had used for its March 21, 1997 letter: 
Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Suite D, Salt Lake City, UT 84107 (Ex. 5, 
Finding 20, R. 980 f 20, 1077 at 45-46). The Domestic Return Receipt from the United 
i 
States Postal Service for the June 21, 2000 letter (Ex. 5) shows that CPMG received the 
letter on June 29, 2000 (Finding 21, R. 980 f^ 21). There was no dispute on this point at 
trial. i 
The only question at issue is this: Did Rite Aid send its notice of renewal to the 
correct address? Comparing and contrasting Exhibits 2 and 3, the trial court concluded 
that because Exhibit 3 referred to the mailing of rent only, it left intact the Exhibit 2 
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address for "mail" and "other mail". As a result the trial court further concluded that Rite 
Aid timely sent its renewal notice to the correct address, and that it consequently had 
effectively exercised its Option. 
Hillside's Issues 2 and 3 both ask the Court to decide if the trial court correctly 
found and concluded that Rite Aid effectively exercised its renewal Option. If this Court 
reads Exhibits 2 and 3 in the same way the trial court did, that ends its examination of 
Hillside's Issues 2 and 3, and the only issue remaining for the Court's attention is 
Hillside's fourth issue, involving attorney fees. 
If, on the other hand, this Court concludes that Exhibit 3 is ambiguous, it then 
needs to address whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding, based on trial 
evidence, that Rite Aid had effectively exercised its Option. 
Rite Aid now addresses that evidence. 
B. Analysis of the Evidence 
As relevant to this issue, the trial court made the following findings: 
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements 
28. In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to change the 
mailing address for all purposes from [CPMC] to Hillside Management; 
Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention (R. 981). 
29. Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August 4, 2000, 
the deadline for Rite Aid's Option exercise (R. 981-82). 
30. Because it changed the address for legal notice only on its PIMS 
system, leaving the address for other correspondence unchanged, it is clear 
that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest read Exhibit 3 as changing the 
address for rent and rent-related activities only, leaving unaffected the 
address contained in Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and 
rent-related activities (R. 982). 
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i 
31. It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for landlords 
and tenants to establish multiple addresses for various types of 
correspondence (R. 982). * 
32. The phrase "property management" does not have any standard or 
generally recognized meaning in the commercial leasing industry (R. 982). 
33. The phrase "property management" may or may not mean "all" < 
activities involving the managed property (R. 982). 
34. Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really small moment 
whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to sending Exhibit 5, because 
Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the address for "rent", and not to other i 
types of correspondence, and therefore changed the address for rent only 
(R. 982). 
35. Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only the address 
for rent and rent-related correspondence was reasonable (R. 982). ( 
36. Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid should be 
charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's unexpressed 
intent (R. 983). 
37. It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management to have 
written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed the address for all 
types of notice; indeed its purported January 21, 1997 letter accomplished 
that purpose (R. 983). 
i 
38. The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that it 
repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy post office 
box address because such correspondence was rent-related, and in many 
cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit monies to the listed address (R. 
983). i 
39. To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the address it was 
using, Hillside provided no explanation of its failure ever to send any 
change of address notice to Rite Aid at the address it had specified in 
Exhibit 4 as applying to legal notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box I 
3165, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) (R. 983). 
As Rite Aid showed in its Statement of the Issues, the Court addresses this issue 
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d at < 
221. In the process of its review, this Court "resolve[s] any ambiguities in the evidence 
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in favor of the trial court's judgment." Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 
P.2dat931. 
Before starting to challenge these twelve findings, Utah law requires Hillside to 
marshal all evidence supporting each of them "in comprehensive and fastidious order". 
Harris v. IES Assocs. Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, \ 39. 
Hillside's purported marshalling is neither comprehensive nor fastidious. To the 
contrary, Hillside makes a half-hearted attempt at summarizing selected testimony, and 
then proceeds to reargue its case. Although the Court should simply reject Hillside's 
challenge as failing the marshaling requirement, Rite Aid shows some of the deficiencies 
in Hillside's argument, below. 
In its unsatisfactory effort to "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence," Brief of 
Appellant at 21 (quoting Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2001 UT App 226, % 42, 29 
P.3d 668, 676)., Hillside argues that Rite Aid's evidence was either inadmissible or failed 
to support the lower court's findings and that Hillside's evidence received insufficient 
consideration. Hillside is wrong. The facts and the law make clear that (1) Robert 
Baker's testimony is admissible as to questions of fact, (2) Hillside's attempt to impeach 
Baker has no effect on the court's findings, (3) Hillside's letter to Rite Aid's maintenance 
personnel is ineffective as notice for change of address, and (4) Hillside failed to show 
that anything in Exhibit 55 effectively changed the address for legal notices. 
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1. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Baker's Testimony to Address 
Factual Questions regarding Common Practices in the Commercial 
Leasing Industry 
Hillside argues that Baker's testimony is inadmissible because he draws legal 
conclusions. As implied above, a trial court may properly admit expert testimony to 
resolve questions of fact in contract disputes. See Sprouse v. Jager at 221. Expert 
witnesses may explain trade usage or custom, clarify ambiguous or technical terms, and 
generally elucidate the parties' intentions. See Craig Food Indus, v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 
279, 283 (Utah 1987). As demonstrated in two examples cited in the Brief of Appellant, 
Mr. Baker's testimony served these purposes. 
First, Baker testified that the phrase "property management" had no generally 
recognized meaning in the commercial leasing industry. See Brief of Appellant 22, \ 8, 
& 23, H 2; R. 1078 at 140. The court properly admitted Baker's testimony to help the 
court answer questions of fact regarding the meaning of the phrase. (Finding 32, R. 982, f 
32) 
Second, Baker submitted to a series of questions at trial regarding whether certain 
actions would be "reasonable" (R. 1078 at 142). Hillside objected, claiming that the 
questions "call[ed] for the ultimate legal conclusion in this case." Id. The trial judge 
overruled Hillside's objections.5 Id. The exchange addressed reasonable custom and 
conduct in the commercial leasing industry, and was, therefore, admissible as to 
questions of fact. 
5
 The trial judge assured that parties that he would disregard any legal conclusions to 
which Baker might testify. Id. 
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2. Hillside's Alleged Impeachment of Baker's Testimony Does Not Alter 
the Court's Findings of Fact or Have Any Impact on the Outcome of 
the Case 
Hillside claims to have "fully impeached" Baker and asks this Court to disregard 
his testimony on such basis. See Brief of Appellant at 24-25. Appellate courts recognize 
"the trial court's position of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors 
bearing on credibility." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). However, even 
the transcripts reveal that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in making findings of 
fact consistent with the witness evidence. There are at least two explanations: (1) the trial 
court found Baker's testimony to be credible; or (2) the trial court disregarded the 
disputed portion of Baker's testimony and based its findings on other evidence. 
Hillside expresses concern with that portion of Baker's testimony discussing the 
September 2 form letter from Hillside (Exhibit 2). See Brief of Appellant at 24-25. When 
cross-examined by Hillside, Baker answered affirmatively that "it might be a typical 
practice . . . to look through the lease file prior to sending a [lease] renewal notice and 
look for a notice letter" (R. 1078 at 145). Then, Mr. Baker testified that the September 2 
letter was a "change of address letter" (R. 1078 at 146). 
Hillside's counsel carefully avoided asking the logical next question: "Change of 
address for what?" Counsel for Rite Aid did ask that question: 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: First, with [respect] to questions you were 
asked about page 43 of your deposition, does Exhibit 3, to your mind, serve 
as a notice of change of address for something? 
BAKER: Yes. 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: What is that something? 
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BAKER: Rent. 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Anything Else? 
BAKER:No. 
(R. 1078 at 154-55). Thus Hillside manufactured the inconsistency it claims at pages 24-
25 of its Brief of Appellant. 
In any event, the trial court may have disregarded Baker's testimony on the issue 
of Exhibit 3, but found his testimony credible as to other factual issues. Hillside cites no 
rule requiring a fact finder to disregard a witness's entire testimony based on a single 
perceived inconsistency. The record contains ample evidence consistent with the court's 
various findings regarding Exhibit 3. 
For example, the following exchange occurred between Right Aid's counsel and 
Johnson, Hillside's witness: 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: You don't say anywhere in Exhibit 3 that the 
address for mail or correspondence or notice for Hillside Plaza, Ltd. is in 
care of Hillside Management, do you? 
JOHNSON: I do not say notice in that document, that is correct? [sic] 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: And you don't say mail and you don't say 
correspondence either, do you? 
JOHNSON: That is correct. 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Mr. Johnson, you have never to this day on 
behalf of Hillside Management of [sic] Hillside Plaza Ltd. sent a letter to 
Rite Aid Corporation, attention Secretary, P.O. Box 3165, Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, by certified mail or not, for that matter, telling Rite Aid to 
send notices or mail to Hillside Plaza in care of Hillside Management at the 
Sandy post office box, have you? 
JOHNSON: No, I have not. 
(R. 1078 at 109:25-110:15). 
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Hillside did not marshal that evidence. 
The trial court could also have based that finding on testimony of I. Lawrence 
Gelman, the Secretary and Vice President of Thrifty Payless ("Gelman") (R. 1077 at 25): 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Mr. Gelman, doesn't Exhibit 3 say that the 
property management company had changed? 
GELMAN: It says property manager's responsibilities have been assumed 
by Hillside management. 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: With respect to that statement, why didn't you 
send Exhibit 5, the Notice of Renewal, to Hillside Plaza, Ltd., the landlord 
in the case of Hillside Management? 
GELMAN: Well, the letter is very specific as to what responsibilities 
they're undertaking. Primarily it talks about rent and there are at least 1, 2, 
3 references to rent and so, in my view, this is a notice of a new property 
manager and that they're assuming responsibility to accept rent on behalf of 
the landlord. They may be doing other things, but what it doesn't say and 
sometimes it's more what something doesn't say that tells you what you're 
looking at, is it doesn't say anything about sending notice of any sort to this 
landlord pursuant to the terms of the lease, this manager, property manager 
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Thank you. Does Exhibit 3 say anything 
about sending mail in general? 
GELMAN: No, it doesn't say anything about mail. It doesn't say anything 
about correspondence. It doesn't say anything about notice. It's really 
quite naked in that regard. 
(R. 1077 at 47:10-48:6). 
Hillside did not marshal that evidence, either. 
In its findings of fact, the trial court stated that the September 2 letter "expressly 
limited the address change to 'rent' and 'rental payments.'" (Finding 14, R. 979 f 14) No 
matter what deficiencies may or may not exist in Baker's testimony, the unchallenged 
and unmarshaled Johnson and Gelman testimony supports Finding 14. 
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Rite Aid could fill the better part of its brief with other evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings on this issue. It is not, however, Rite Aid's duty to do so. Out of an 
abundance of caution, however, Rite Aid briefly discusses below the singular role of 
exchanges between Hillside and Bernard Reth, a Rite Aid employee ("Reth"). 
3. Hillside's Correspondence with Reth Did Not Effectively Change the 
Address to which Rite Aid Should Send Legal Notices 
Hillside makes repeated references to Reth in its Brief of Appellant. Basically, 
Hillside argues that a July 22, 1999 letter that Hillside wrote to Reth about the painting of 
a curb (Trial Exhibit 7; R. 1077 at 52) gave Rite Aid legally sufficient notice of Hillside's 
correct address for legal notice. There are three independent reasons why Exhibit 7 did 
not give Rite Aid notice that Hillside had purportedly changed its address for legal 
notices. 
First, Hillside sent the letter to Reth at P.O. Box 1169, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. 
In a March 21, 1997 letter (Exhibit 4), however, Rite Aid told Hillside that all future legal 
notices (such as the change of address for legal notice) must be sent: "Attention: 
Secretary, P.O. Box 3165, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania". Reth was neither Rite Aid's 
corporate Secretary, nor did he receive his mail at the same address as Rite Aid's legal 
department (1 Tr. 52). Reth has nothing to do with Rite Aid's legal department (R. 1077 
at 52). He was a landlord liaison in Rite Aid's maintenance group (R. 1077 at 51), and 
received his mail through a post office box in an entirely different city (Camp Hill) than 
the one Rite Aid had designated for service of legal notices (Harrisburg). See Exhibit 7. 
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Second, Reth had no authority to act for Rite Aid with respect to receiving legal 
notices. In his capacity as a landlord liaison, he dealt with maintenance items for some of 
Rite Aid's 3500 (R. 1077 at 28) stores (R. 1077 at 51). That is the reason Reth was the 
author of the initial July 8, 1999 letter to Hillside concerning painting the curb red. (Ex. 
55, fourth page) 
Third, ignoring the obvious limitations on Reth's authority - and once again 
ignoring its duty to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's findings - Hillside 
obliquely argues at pages 31-33 of its Brief of Appellant, that a letter to Reth - one of 
80,000 Rite Aid employees (R. 1077 at 54:11) - provided legally sufficient notice under 
the Lease to Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. This is not the law. 
It is axiomatic that an agent must act pursuant to either actual or apparent 
authority. See, e.g., Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 
(Utah 1988). The Zions Court described the contours of actual authority: 
Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express and implied authority. 
Express authority exists whenever the principal directly states that its agent 
has the authority to perform a particular act on the principal's behalf. 
Implied authority, on the other hand, embraces authority to do those acts 
which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or 
perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent. 
Id. It is undisputed that Reth's authority began and ended with working with landlords 
on maintenance-related issues. Therefore he did not have actual authority to receive 
change-of-address notices on behalf of Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. 
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The law similarly makes clear that Reth did not have apparent authority to receive 
legal notices for Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. Apparent authority arises only in a I 
precisely defined way: 
Nor is the authority of the agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to 
the person with whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third * 
parties to believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority . . . . 
Id. at 1095. Hillside presented no evidence that Rite Aid ever told Hillside anything 
about the scope of Reth's authority. Hillside accordingly cannot successfully claim that •' 
Reth had apparent authority to receive legal notices on behalf of Rite Aid's corporate 
Secretary. 
Two additional decisions establish that Hillside's letter to Reth did not constitute 
notice to Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. In Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 763 
P.2d 761, 767 (Utah 1988) the court stated the applicable rule: "[T]he knowledge of the 
agent is not imputed to the principal where the agent's duties or apparent duties have no 
connection with the subject matter to which the knowledge relates."
 { 
Earlier, in Bank of Salt Lake v. The Corp. ofPres. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saintsf 534 P.2d 887, 888 (Utah 1975), the court reversed the trial court's 
finding that notice to Leland Bruderer, a Church employee at its Seminaries and Institutes 
Department, constituted legal notice to the Church itself of a vendor's assignment to 
plaintiff bank of the right to payment for goods delivered to Bruderer's department. In 
reversing the trial court the Supreme Court explained: 
The subject notices never came to the attention of the Church, neither were they 
delivered to the place of business . . . held out by the Church as the place for the 
receipt of such communications. Due diligence did not require communication of 
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such information, since such was not one of Bruderer's duties; furthermore, 
Bruderer in the performance of his work did not have reason to know of the terms 
of the invoices and therefore that the transaction would be materially affected by 
his information concerning the assignment. 
Id. at 891. Hillside's notion that notice to Reth was notice to Rite Aid's corporate 
Secretary is therefore wishful thinking and nothing more. Just as with Bruderer, Reth 
"did not have reason to know" that the Lease "would be materially affected by his 
information concerning" a mailing address which, as far as Reth knew, applied solely to 
him. 
4. Nothing in Exhibit 55 Effectively Changed Hillside's Address for Legal 
Notices 
For the reasons addressed in subsection D, supra at 11, the trial court found as 
follows with respect to the Annette Johnson Letter: 
24. Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from Annette 
Johnson of Hillside management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's predecessor-in-
interest (the "January 21, 1997 Letter") (R. 981). 
25. At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that Hillside ever 
sent the January 21,1997 Letter to Rite Aid or anyone else (R. 981). 
26. Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or justifying 
Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial (R.981). 
27. The Court has great concern regarding the authenticity of the 
January 21, 1997 Letter; in any event, Hillside has not met its burden of 
proving that Hillside Management sent that letter. As a result the Court 
will disregard it (R. 981). 
Hillside does not appeal the trial court's refusal to consider the Annette Johnson 
Letter at trial. Hillside does, however, make various amorphous arguments that the 
remaining documents in Exhibit 55 somehow (1) provided Rite Aid with notice of 
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Hillside's address for legal notices, or (2) show that Rite Aid realized that it should send 
legal notices to the address contained in Exhibit 3. < 
With respect to those arguments, the trial court found: 
38. The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that it 
repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy post office * 
box address because such correspondence was rent-related, and in many 
cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit monies to the listed address. 
R.983. 
i 
An examination of Exhibit 55 shows that, with the Exception of Exhibits 3 -
which Hillside also included in Exhibit 55 - and the discredited Annette Johnson Letter, 
everything Rite Aid sent was indeed rent or rent-related. Everything Hillside sent either ( 
involved rent or rent-related issues (CAM charges, taxes), or signage. Nothing remotely 
involved notice of an address change for legal notices. 
Once again, Hillside failed to marshal any of that evidence. Rite Aid has briefly 
done Hillside's marshaling for it in the preceding paragraphs. There is ample factual 
support for Findings Nos. 28-39. To the extent there might be any ambiguities in the 
evidence, this Court resolves those ambiguities in favor of the trial court's judgment. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings. If the Court does so, it
 { 
need not reach Hillside's third issue on appeal - the issue of equitable mistake. 
III. EVEN IF RITE AID WERE MISTAKEN IN ITS READING OF 
EXHIBIT 3, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
MISTAKE TO BE EQUITABLY EXCUSED 
As shown in the prior section of this argument, the trial court concluded that Rite 
Aid strictly complied with the terms of the Lease in effectively exercising its Option. In 
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addition to finding that Rite Aid had strictly complied with the renewal Option under the 
Lease, the trial court made alternative findings: 
Mistake 
47. Alternatively, Rite Aid interpreted Exhibit 3 in a manner 
inconsistent with Hillside Management's intention (R. 983-84). 
48. Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3 (R. 984). 
49. The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only with "rent" or 
"rental" (R. 984). 
50. Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion inherent in 
Exhibit 3 (R. 984). 
51. It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge Rite Aid with 
knowledge of what was in Hillside Management's mind (R. 984). 
52. To the extent that Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong address, 
that error was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake in interpreting 
Exhibit 3 (R. 984). 
53. No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in exercising 
the Option to renew the Lease (R. 984). 
The trial court then concluded: 
12. Alternatively, to the extent Rite Aid was mistaken in its 
interpretation of Exhibit 3, that mistake is equitably excused under the 
foregoing factual circumstances (R. 986). 
Hillside does not challenge the trial court's findings as they apply to this issue. 
Instead, it challenges the court's alternative conclusion, arguing that strict compliance is 
required and equitable excuse is unavailable. See Brief of Appellant at 40. Because 
Hillside does not challenge - or marshal evidence supporting - the trial court's findings 
regarding mistake, this Court accepts those findings as true and proceeds to a review of 
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the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law to the 
undisputed facts. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). < 
Accordingly, this Court's role is to determine if the trial court's unchallenged 
findings support its Conclusion No. 12. The trial court correctly concluded that even if 
Rite Aid were mistaken in its reading of Exhibit 3, that mistake was equitably excused. 
This Court reviews the trial court's conclusion under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
U.S. Realty 86, 2002 UT 14, Tf 12, Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d at 65-66. ( 
In appealing that conclusion Hillside relies on Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d at 
70, to support its contention that "when [an] optionee decides to exercise his option he 
must act unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option." Brief of 
Appellant at 40. However, Hillside omits the exceptions recognized in the Geisdorf 
opinion: 
Indeed, there are instances in which deviation from strict compliance may 
be equitably excused. . . . [One instance] in which an optionee may be 
excused from strict compliance [is] when the optionee's conduct in failing 
to comply was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the 
optionee but was rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake... 
Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d at 71. 
Hillside also relies on Utah Coal and Lumber, 2001 UT 100, Tf 11, in which the 
tenant failed to timely exercise a renewal option to renew a lease with its landlord. The 
landlord brought an unlawful detainer action, and the tenant successfully argued to the 
trial court that its failure to strictly comply with the Lease renewal provision should be 
equitably excused. The landlord appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
the tenant. See id. at \ 1. 
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Unlike the present case, however, the tenant in Utah Coal did not timely mail its 
notice of renewal. To the contrary, it mailed the notice eleven days late. See id. at ^ 5. 
Relying on the foregoing language from Geisdorf, the trial court found that the tenant's 
failure to renew the lease timely was the result of an "honest and justifiable mistake." 
Seeid.at^l. 
On appeal, the landlord argued that the tenant's failure did not arise from a 
mistake at all, but was rather the result of inattention and negligence, and that "mere 
negligence" does not merit application of the equitable excuse doctrine recognized in the 
Geisdorf opinion. See id. at ffl[ 8, 10. 
The Utah Supreme Court found the nature of the tenant's conduct to be the critical 
inquiry. The tenant simply forgot to mail the notice on time because of its own oversight, 
forgetfulness and preoccupation with other matters. In the words of one of the tenant's 
owners: "It wasn't for any reason other than I was busy. We were busy doing other 
things in our business, wearing other hats." Id. at f 19. 
In reversing the trial court's summary judgment for the tenant, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that mistake and negligence are different: "[I]n equity a mistake cannot be 
based on a negligent act or omission." Id. at f 20. The Court further explained: 
When one is charged with a duty, and forgets to do it, it may under certain 
circumstances constitute excusable negligence, but it cannot be held to be a 
mistake. . . Negligently and inadvertently omitting to perform a duty is far 
different than to omit it through mistake or accident. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Utah Coal court then defined "mistake": 
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A mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous 
mental condition, conception or conviction induced by ignorance, 
misapprehension, or misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission < 
done or suffered by one or both parties, without its erroneous character 
being intended or known at the time 
Id. (quoting 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 7 (1996)) (emphasis added). 
By way of illustration, the Utah Coal court expressly noted that excusable mistake 
includes a contracting party's mistaken "understanding of the contract". Id. (emphasis 
provided by the White Pine court) (citing Jensen v. Manila Corp. of Church of Jesus i 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 64-65 (Utah 1977)). 
Thus, Utah Coal states a simple legal rule regarding the effect of mistake in the 
context of lease renewal: "Where a lessee's failure to exercise an option to renew a lease 
in a timely manner is due to . . . mistake . . . it would be oppressive and unjust to require 
strict compliance with the lease, and thus equity should be invoked." Utah Coal and 
Lumber, 2001 UT 100, f^ 14. So here, it would be oppressive and unjust for this Court to 
find Rite Aid failed to exercise its Option because it made a mistake in interpreting 
Hillside's 1996 Letter - a letter that the trial court found Rite Aid strictly complied with. 
Hillside asks the Court to hold that equitable mistake is never available to a tenant 
who misinterprets a document, because the misinterpretation necessarily means that the 
tenant did not strictly comply. This heads-I-win-tails-you-lose position would nullify the 
holding of Utah Coal and the other cases Rite Aid discusses in this section. For Utah 
Coal to have any vitality at all, it must mean, at a minimum, that if a tenant misinterprets 
a lease provision in the same way as a district court judge, the tenant made a "mistake". 
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Two months after entry of its Utah Coal decision, the Utah Supreme Court 
decided U.S. Realty 86 Assoc. There, the tenant sent its notices of renewal more than 
forty-five days late, see id. at f 7, and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking 
equitable relief. See id. at Tf 1. The tenant's employees readily admitted that they did not 
even read the leases until after the forty-five days had expired. See id. at f 18. 
The trial court in US. Realty concluded that, as professionals, the tenant's 
employees had to exercise a higher duty of care than ordinary tenants, and that their 
failure to read the leases until forty-five days after the renewal deadline had passed 
amounted to "wilful and gross negligence". See id. at If 12. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court but rejected its analysis, making it clear "that courts do not need 
to inquire into, nor do we need to address, the level of negligence that may contribute to a 
lessee's failure to timely exercise its option. Negligence, regardless of the type, may not, 
by itself, serve as grounds for equitable relief." Id. at f 13. 
Citing the same American Jurisprudence passage as the Utah Coal court, the US. 
Realty court confirmed that a negligent act cannot constitute a "mistake" in the legal 
sense. See id. at If 17. Accordingly, because the trial court found that the tenant's 
employees were negligent, and found nothing that would constitute a "mistake", the 
Utah Supreme Court held that equitable relief was unwarranted. See id. 
As shown above, the Utah Coal court expressly noted that the misunderstanding 
of contractual provisions is mistake, not negligence. See Utah Coal and Lumber, 2001 
UT 100 at \ 20. In light of the lower court's finding that the change of address portion 
Exhibit 3 did not apply to legal notices, there is no factual basis for negligence. Indeed, 
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in its Finding No. 46 the trial court wrote: uNo trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was 
negligent in exercising the Option to renew the Lease." R. at 984. 
Consequently, even if this Court should conclude that Rite Aid (and the trial court) 
were mistaken in their reading of Exhibit 3, the law makes clear that equity can and 
should properly excuse that mistake. For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that any mistake Rite Aid might have made in reading 
Exhibit 3 was equitably excused. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ATTORNEY FEE AWARD TO RITE AID 
WAS JUSTIFIED AND PROPER 
Utah courts award attorneys' fees according to the terms of the contract. See, e.g., 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Interpretation of a contract 
to determine whether attorneys' fees are recoverable is a question of law. See Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. National Am, Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d at 656. This Court accordingly 
reviews a determination of such questions for correctness. Id. 
A. The Lease Provides that Hillside, As the Breaching Party, Is Liable to 
Rite Aid for Attorneys Fees 
The Lease provides: "The costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, of any 
action brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions of this Lease, shall be borne by 
the party adjudged by the court to have violated any of the terms or provisions of this 
Lease." (Ex. 51 at 15, section 23) 
In a prior action between Hillside and Rite Aid, this Court has already determined 
that this same Lease provision in this same Lease required an award of attorneys fees to 
the prevailing party in an interpretive dispute. See Thrifty Payless v. Hillside Plaza Ltd,, 
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2001 UT App 296 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In that earlier case, Rite Aid and Hillside 
sought resolution of a contract dispute regarding the proper interpretation of a tax offset 
provision. Id. This Court found that Rite Aid had interpreted the Lease Agreement 
correctly, that it had not waived its right to offsets, and that it still had a right to assert its 
offsets. Id. at 2. 
Even though all Hillside had done in that action was contest Rite Aid's 
interpretation of the Lease, this court concluded that Hillside had breached the Lease by 
contesting Rite Aid's efforts to exercise its offset rights. Consequently, "Rite Aid was 
entitled to attorney fees and costs," including its costs on appeal. Id. 
In the present action, Hillside violated section 2 of the Lease by failing to honor 
Rite Aid's Option to Extend (R. 971-72). The trial court found that Rite Aid strictly 
complied with the terms of the Lease in exercising its Option (R. 986, ]f 10). However, 
even after Hillside received actual notice of Rite Aid's claim that it had effectively 
exercised the Option, Hillside nevertheless declared the Option expired, took steps to 
evict Rite Aid, and forced Rite Aid to post a bond to prevent its eviction (R. 435-37, 
971). The trial court found that Hillside's conduct constituted a violation of the Lease (R. 
971-72). 
In the earlier action, this Court found that Hillside's misinterpretation of the Lease 
and denial of a lease right was a breach of the Lease entitling Rite Aid to an award of its 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Lease. In the present action, Hillside breached its 
Lease obligation by failing to afford Rite Aid its Option renewal rights. That breach 
entitles Rite Aid to attorneys' fees and costs. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Attorney 
Fees in a Reasonable Amount 
The trial court is in the best position "to gauge the quality and efficiency of the 
representation and the complexity of the litigation." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 
P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). Therefore, the amount of an attorney fee award "will not be 
reversed unless the court abuses its discretion." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court developed the following practical guidelines for a trial 
court to use in determining a reasonable fee award: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). 
In its June 17, 2002 Minute Entry, the trial court ruled: "The Court takes the 
Affidavits filed by Mr. Wycoff and Ms. Meyer as establishing prima facie entitlement to 
the fees requested. The burden will then be upon counsel for Hillside to demonstrate 
inappropriateness of the bills through cross-examination or other testimony at such an 
evidentiary hearing. A notice of said hearing is enclosed (emphasis added)." 
Next, Hillside's counsel filed an August 21, 2002 Affidavit enumerating the fees 
and costs they had billed Hillside for representation in this matter (R. 1002-04). On 
September 26, 2002, the trial court entered its Incourt Note: "Based upon stipulation of 
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counsel, per phone messages, the hearing set for today is vacated, and counsel will 
submit written memos. No further hearing will be necessary on these issues." (R. 1005). 
On September 30, 2002, counsel for Hillside filed a Stipulation Concerning 
Attorney Fees, wherein they stated: 
Hillside is agreeable to submitting written objections regarding the 
reasonableness of Rite Aid's attorney fees, and to Rite Aid's filing a 
response thereto. Hillside withdraws its earlier request for a hearing and 
requests the Court to rule on this stipulation of facts and on the written 
submissions of law and argument. 
(R. 1007). 
Hillside further stipulated that (1) Rite Aid's counsel worked the hours and 
incurred the costs they billed Rite Aid, and (2) the billing rates of Rite Aid's counsel 
were reasonable within the Salt Lake City Community (R. 1007-08). 
On October 1, 2002 Hillside filed its Memorandum Opposing Award of Attorney 
Fees to Rite Aid (R. 1011-16). In that memorandum, Hillside presented no evidence of 
any description except to assert that Rite Aid's total fees were higher than Hillside's. 
Rather, Hillside merely argued that the litigation was not complex, and that Rite Aid 
made inefficient use of its counsel. 
Rite Aid replied that except for the amounts of the respective attorney fees, all of 
Hillside's arguments 
contained in Hillside's memorandum were contained in the previous 
memoranda submitted last spring, as to which, the Court ruled that an 
evidentiary hearing was appropriate to give Hillside the opportunity to 
present evidence proving that Rite Aid's fees were inappropriate. 
Otherwise, the Court ruled, Rite Aid had prima facie established its entitled 
to the fees detailed and requested. Hillside has failed to meet its burden of 
proving the inappropriateness of Rite Aid's fee request. This Court ruled 
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that Hillside had the burden to demonstrate the inappropriateness of Rite 
Aid's fees through cross-examination or other testimony. Hillside chose 
instead to waive an evidentiary hearing and the presentation of evidence. 
Moreover, Hillside's memorandum is insufficient to meet its burden of 
proof. It merely repeats the same mantra that Rite Aid's fee request is too 
high, without providing any evidence to support its argument. 
R. 1019 (emphasis in original). 
In reply, Hillside again argued that the case was not complex, and that Rite Aid 
made inefficient use of its counsel by hiring attorneys from separate law firms. On this 
second issue, Hillside wrote: "Rite Aid's sole motive for hiring two law firms was that 
both senior attorneys were experienced in the legal issues involved and both had 
previously had done local work for Rite Aid. . . . This is Hillside's proof that the attorney 
fees charged by Rite Aid are unreasonable." R. 1027 (emphasis in original). Hillside 
never explained, however, why it is not objectionable for two attorneys in one firm to 
work on a case (as Hillside's counsel did), but it is improper for one attorney in each of 
two firms to work together. 
In its December 20, 2002 Minute Entry, the trial court recited the history of the 
attorney fee issue. Then wrote: "Hillside merely relies on its own assertion that the fees 
requested are too high, without providing any evidence to support its argument." 
(R.1035). With respect to Hillside's "objections", the trial court concluded "that these 
factors prove nothing in terms of efficiency or reasonableness. Without more, Hillside's 
opposition lacks any legal basis for the Court to reduce the amount of fees being sought" 
(R. 1036). 
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As stated above, the trial court was in the best position to gauge the complexity of 
the litigation, the efficiency of the counsel, and the overall reasonability of an attorney 
fee request. Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d at 380. Moreover, "[w]here the 
evidence supporting the reasonableness of requested attorney fees is both adequate and 
entirely undisputed, as it was here, the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than 
the amount requested unless the reduction is warranted by one or more of the factors 
described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken" Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 517-18 
(UtahCt.App. 1989). 
Given the circumstances described above and Hillside's utter failure to adduce any 
factual or legal basis for its arguments, the trial court was well within its discretion in 
making its attorney fee award to Rite Aid. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM the trial court's judgment in 
all respects. 
DATED: July /f, 2003 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
Bruce Wycoff j ^ 
Billie Siddoway ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellees 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a 
California corporation, d/b/a 
RITE AID, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a 
California limited partnership, 
d/b/a HILLSIDE PLAZA 
PROPERTIES, and COLLIERS 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Defendants. 
HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a 
California limited partnership 
d/b/a/ HILLSIDE PLAZA 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 000910098 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
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PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a : 
California corporation d/b/a/ : 
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG 
STORES, INC., an Illinois : 
corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
The Court conducted a bench trial of this matter beginning 
March 18, 2002. Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Thrifty Payless, Inc. 
("Thrifty")and Rite Aid Corporation ("Rite Aid"), along with 
Counterdefendant American Drug Stores ("ADS") , appeared personally 
and through their counsel of record, Cynthia K. C. Meyer of Morgan, 
Meyer, and Rice, L.C., and Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough. Defendant/Counterclaimant, Hillside Plaza, Ltd. 
("Hillside"), appeared personally and through its counsel of 
record, Scott 0. Mercer and Ryan Hancey, of Kesler & Rust. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having 
observed their demeanor and credibility, having carefully read the 
trial memoranda submitted by the parties, and being fully apprised 
in the matter, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
532686v2 2 
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Parties 
1. Thrifty is a California Corporation with it principal 
place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 
2. Rite Aid is a Delaware Corporation with its principal 
place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 
3. Thrifty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Rite Aid 
Corporation. (Hereafter, the Court will refer to Thrifty and Rite 
Aid collectively as "Rite Aid"). 
4. Hillside is a California limited partnership that 
regularly conducts business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. On or about May 6, 1974, Hillside Plaza Associates 
("HPA"), as landlord, entered into a written Lease Agreement (the 
"Lease"), with Skaggs Companies, Inc. ("Skaggs"), as tenant, in 
which HPA leased to Skaggs retail space located at 2378 East 7000 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property") 
6. Rite Aid is the successor-in-interest to Skaggs. 
7. Hillside is the successor-in-interest to HPA. 
8. ADS, a previous successor-in-interest to Skaggs, 
guaranteed the performance under the Lease of any successors to, 
assignees of, or subtenants under, its interests. 
Factual Background 
9. The original Lease term began on October 6, 1975, and was 
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to expire on January 31, 2001 unless Rite Aid gave Hillside timely 
written notice of Rite Aid's intent to renew the Lease.. 
10. At some point not disclosed by the record, Hillside hired 
Commerce Properties Management Corporation ("CPMG") to perform 
property management functions for the Property. 
11. On March 19, 1992, CPMG sent a form letter (Trial Exhibit 
2) giving Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest the following notice: 
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and 
other mail to our former address. Effective March 20, 
1992 our brokerage company is moving from their location 
at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In the 
future all rental payments and mail for [CPMG] should be 
addressed as follows: 
Hillside Plaza Limited 
Commerce Properties Management Corp. 
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(Emphasis added) 
12. On September 2, 1996 Hillside Management, an assumed name 
of an entity legally distinct from Hillside, which has no common 
owners, sent a form letter ("Hillside's 1996 Letter") (Trial 
Exhibit 3) to Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest. Trial Exhibit 3 
recites that "the property management responsibilities for Hillside 
Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of 
Hillside Management." Exhibit 3 contained the following notice: 
For the month of September, 1996, [CPMG] will forward 
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your rental payment to Hillside Management* Please 
mail your future rent payments as follows: 
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center 
c/o Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, Utah 84090 
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with 
the terms of your lease and must be received no later 
than the date specified in your lease. 
(Emphasis added) 
13. Although Exhibit 3 was not sent by registered or 
certified mail, Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest received and 
acted on the letter soon after September 2, 1996, and placed the 
letter in its lease file. 
14. Unlike Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3 gave no change of address 
instructions for "mail" or "other mail". It expressly limited the 
address change to "rent" and "rental" payments. 
15. In fact, by the date of Exhibit 3, Hillside had relieved 
CPMG of all property management duties, and had transferred all 
those duties to Hillside Management, a legally separate entity from 
Hillside. 
16. On March 21, 1997 Rite Aid wrote Hillside, requesting 
that all future legal notices be sent to one address, and that all 
future non-legal correspondence such as billings be sent to a 
different address. (Trial Exhibit 4) 
532686v2 5 
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17. Because Exhibit 4 was a legal notice, Rite Aid sent it to 
the address it had used for general, non-rental, mail before 
receipt of Exhibit 3: Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Ste 
D, Salt Lake City, Utah 841070000. 
18. Rite Aid's legal notice regarding its change of address 
reached Hillside shortly after March 21, 1997. 
19. The Lease further provides, at 5(2): 
OPTION TO EXTEND: Tenant, at its option may extend the 
term of this Lease for not to exceed four separate and 
additional consecutive periods of 5 years each. Each 
such extension shall be exercised by giving written 
notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the 
expiration of the original term hereof or any such 
extended term. Upon such exercise, this Lease and the 
Lease Agreement shall be deemed to be extended without 
the execution of any further lease of other instrument. 
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite 
Aid's exercise of the Option, and renewal not later than August 4, 
2000, the date 180 days before January 31, 2002. 
20. Accordingly, on June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via 
certified mail, return receipt requested, its notice of renewal of 
the Lease (Trial Exhibit 5) to the same address it had used for its 
March 21, 1997 letter (Exhibit 4): Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 
320 West, Suite D, Salt Lake City, UT 84107. 
21. CPMG received the letter on June 29, 2000. 
22. CPMG personnel "probably" or "likely" forwarded Exhibit 
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5 to Hillside Management. 
23. Sometime after the August 4, 2001 renewal date had 
passed, Hillside, through counsel, advised Rite Aid's counsel, 
Cynthia Meyer, that Rite Aid had failed to exercise the Option as 
the Lease required. 
24. Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from 
Annette Johnson of Hillside Management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's 
predecessor-in-interest (the "January 21, 1997 Letter"). 
25. At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that 
Hillside Management ever sent the January 21, 1997 Letter to Rite 
Aid or to anyone else. 
26. Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or 
justifying Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial. 
27. The Court has great concern regarding the authenticity of 
the January 21, 1997 Letter; in any event, Hillside has not met its 
burden of proving that Hillside Management sent that letter. As a 
result, the Court will disregard it. 
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements 
28. In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to 
change the mailing address for all purposes from CPMG to Hillside 
Management; Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention. 
29. Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August 
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4, 2000, the deadline for Rite Aid's Option exercise, 
30. Because it changed the address for legal notice only on 
its PIMS system, leaving the address for other correspondence 
unchanged, it is clear that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest read 
Exhibit 3 as changing the address for rent and rent-related 
activities only, leaving unaffected the address contained in 
Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and rent-related 
activities. 
31. It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for 
landlords and tenants to establish multiple addresses for various 
types of correspondence. 
32. The Phrase "property management" does not have any 
standard or generally recognized meaning in the commercial leasing 
industry. 
33. The phrase "property management" may or may not mean 
"all" activities involving the managed property. 
34. Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really 
small moment whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to 
sending Exhibit 5, because Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the 
address for "rent", and not to other types of correspondence, and 
therefore changed the address for rent only. 
35. Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only 
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the address for rent and rent-related correspondence was 
reasonable. 
36. Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid 
should be charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's 
unexpressed intent. 
37. It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management 
to have a written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed 
the address for all types of notice; indeed its purported January 
21, 1997 Letter accomplished that purpose. 
38. The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that 
it repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy 
post office box address because such correspondence was rent-
related, and in many cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit 
monies to the listed address. 
39. To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the 
address it was using, Hillside provided no explanation of its 
failure ever to send any change of address notice to Rite Aid at 
the address it had specified in Exhibit 4 as applying to legal 
notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box 3165, Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania) . 
Mistake 
40. Al te rna t ive ly , Rite Aid in te rpre ted Exhibit 3 in a manner 
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inconsistent with Hillside Management's intention. 
41. Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3. 
1 
42. The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only 
with ''rent'" or "rental". 
43. Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion 
inherent in Exhibit 3. 
44. It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge 
Rite Aid with knowledge of what wras in Hillside Management's mind. . 
45. To the extent Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong 
address, that error was the result of a honest and justifiable 
mistake in interpreting Exhibit 3. ( 
46. No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in 
exercising the Option to renew the Lease. 
The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters the * 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
4 
Having made the foregoing factual findings, the Court has 
determined that they support the following legal conclusions, or 
that it is appropriate to make the following conclusions as a 
i 
matter of law: 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 
matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
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2. At trial, Hillside relied on The January 21, 1997 Letter 
which, as a matter of law, would have been dispositive of the 
issues at trial in favor of Hillside if Hillside could establish 
that it sent it to Rite Aid's predecessor, and that Rite Aid's 
predecessor had received it. 
3. The burden is on Hillside to show that Hillside 
Management sent the January 21, 1997 Letter; the burden is not on 
Rite Aid to show that Hillside Management did not send it or that 
Rite Aid's predecessor did not receive it. 
4. There is no presumption of mailing; to the contrary the 
law is explicit regarding the evidence necessary to establish 
mailing. 
5. The January 21, 1997 Letter is legally entitled to no 
weight. 
6. The effectiveness of Exhibit 5 to exercise Rite Aid's 
option to renew the Lease (the "Option") therefore rises or falls 
with Exhibit 3. 
7. As the January 21, 1997 Letter shows, Hillside 
Management, as the agent for Hillside, had the ability to express 
in Exhibit 3 with reasonable clarity what Hillside Management 
intended. 
8. Nothing in the Lease prevented Rite Aid or Hillside in 
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having multiple addresses for different purposes. 
9. Rite Aid was obligated to strictly comply with the 
Lease's Option and renewal provisions. 
10. By sending Exhibit 5 to the address it did, Rite Aid 
strictly complied with the Lease's Option and renewal provisions; 
if Rite Aid had sent Exhibit 5 to Hillside Management at the 
address shown in Exhibit 3, Hillside could have argued that Rite 
Aid had not strictly complied with Exhibit 3. 
11. Exhibit 3 does not substantially comply with the Lease's 
provisions for changing the address for legal notices because it 
changes the address for rent only. 
12. Alternatively, to the extent Rite Aid was mistaken in its 
interpretation of Exhibit 3, that mistake is equitably excused 
under the foregoing factual circumstances. 
13. Exhibit 3 is not ambiguous. It says send rent payments 
to the new address. Rite Aid did that. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Rite Aid effectively renewed the Lease for an additional 
five-year term. 
2. Rite Aid is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession 
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of the Property to the extent set forth in the Lease. 
3. Hillside shall take nothing by its Complaint. All claims 
that Hillside raised, or could have raised through the date of the 
trial in this matter, are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. 
4. The Third District Court Clerk shall immediately release 
all cash or possession bonds Rite Aid has filed or deposited with 
the Clerk in connection with these consolidated actions. 
5. The Court expressly reserves ruling on Rite Aid's 
entitlement to attorney fees, and amount of those fees, until Rite 
Aid has properly brought the matter before the Court pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-505. 
6. Pursuant to ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 
254, 1 15 (Utah 2000), this Order is not final for purposes of 
appeal until this Court has disposed of the reserved attorney fee 
issue 
DATED: 4(pr±l- , 2002, 
BY THE/COURT 
'imothy R. H, 
rThird District Court Judge 
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?a(^r 
-March, 19 19^^ 
-Q Cor- ? ayi ass 3330 
S275 SW Peyton Lane 
Wilsonville, CH 37070 
He: Change of Adcres 
Rental Payments 
Dear Tenants and Business ?.s: oc ia t ss , 
l oca tec i r r awr i 4 i t ^ d - S f S ^ i r ° p o 5 * \ . e s Management has been 
Commerce P r o p e r ^ e s " f l ? I ^ ? B ? ^ ^ ? E ^ u r ! b r o k e r a g e ccmoany, 
r e n t a l payments i l l o t a ^ m ^ V * y o u . h a v e t i n n e d t c d e l i v e r 
-March 20, 1392 our hr-nt ° ° U r f c r ™ e r a d d r e s s . E f f e c t i v e 
* t 275 Eas t J . ? e m p " 7 o % \ r m P a a y " ^ x " 0 " 1 1 1 9 f " ™ t h e i r l o c a t i o n 
r e n t a l payments X w Q ! " W « £ f l c e a - . ^ t h e f u t u r e a l l 
be a d d r e s s e d as followV: C o m m e r c s P r o p e r t i e s Management should 
H i l l s i d e Plaza Limi ted - T 
;; ccjranerce P r o p e r t i e s Management Corp. 
^ 8 ^ South 320 West, S u i t e D-1Q0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84107 ' ' 
^ - W ^ b l 1 . 7 t c ^ S * ™ ^ ^ " ^ y T ! * • < * * ^ o u l d NOT be 
made p a y a b l e to t*e b u s A p ? , nl - }• VSXlt^ P a ^ ^ t s shou ld be 
r e f e r e n c e d above i n S S 3 n a m e ° r t : : e P r o p e r t y you occupy as 
If you have any q u e s t i o n s c r i f we can be of 
p l e a s e do not h e s i t a t e t o c o n t a c t 
f o r your c o o p e r a t i o n . 
a s s i s t a n c e i n any way,, 
your p r o p e r t y manager . Thank you 
*.or^ Eawcen 
A s s i s t a n t 3*-o"*s>-*«, M - ^ - ' 
MAR ^ :B92 
' ^LwCi v C J 
if 
.;v;;. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
ALL-STATE* INTERNATIONAL 
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HUlside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, Utah 84090 
801-047^130 
SEP 0 6f3S5 
September 2> I996 
Christopher Sloan 
Property Accounting 
Thrifty PayLess, Inc. 
9275 S: W.Peyton Lane 
Wilsorrville' OR 97070 W 
S^ 
Re; '" Hillside Plaza^Shopping "Center 
PayLess S#re#353£ 
Dear Ms. Hammer,, 
Effective September I. 1996, the property management responsibilities for;Hillside Plaza \ 
Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management. With 
the organization of HUlside-Management, and with the assignment of this-responsibility to 
Annette, we should be able to ensure a high level of attention to the needs of the tenants . 
of Hillside Plaza. Annette can be reached at 801-947-91.30.. • 
For the month of September, 1996," Commerce Properties Management Corp. wiil forward 
your rental payment to Hillside Management. Please mail your future rent payments as 
follows: " • • ' • . . • • . 
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center 
c'oHilhideManagement • • 
; P.O.. Box 900511 . • ' • ' • " 
; Sandy, UT. 84090 . . ; . • / . 
Your rental payments should he made in accordance with the terms of your lease and must 
be received' no later than the due date specified' in.your lease. .* 
You may be aware that the ownership of Hillsida Plaza has recently refinanced its loan for 
the shopping earner. In accordance with the.terms of this new loan, several "caprtai 
. improvement and repair projects wiil be underway during this fail and next spring. The 
most significant capital improvement projects include: the planned addition of new sign 
bands above the northeast ±ops and above the plaza shops: and'extensive-renovations to 
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C h r i s t o p h e r S loan . . . ' . . • ' / 
' S e p t e m b e r 25 1996 . ' • •' • •'.. ' .•'• "'.:.• 
" P a g e 2 ' • . . • . . • , • ' • " • / ' • • • • '.. "-. ' '\ ' 
• the plaza area. At this time architects', are in the process of designing: the renovations. 
Upon completion of the planning phase Tve will encourage interested tenants "to-review the 
plans. The most significant repair projects.'include: paridng lot work; roof work; and 
landscape improvements scheduled for next spring. We will make, every effort to minimize. 
any inconvenience these projects may present for tenants and shopping center patrons. 
Your input will be -welcome both now and during the course of the projects.- We. are 
certain you will be-please with- the end result. 
Thank you in advance lor your coopenrtion. If Annette can be of assistance in any way7 
please do not hesitate to contact her 
John S. Johnson' 
Asset Manager 
;c. RobBirdsley 
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LEASE 
THIS LEASE is mace and entered into as of the 6m day --' 
M
*y _ , 1974, be tween HILLSIDE PLAZA . .SSCCIATES" a
 3 a r l - . = r -
ship ( " L a n d l o r d " ) / a n d S K A G O S COMPANIES, INC., a D e : ^ a r e c o r - ^ - - " 
( " T e n a n t " ) . 
Fo r and in cons ide ra t ion of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and 
other good a n d v a l u a b l e cons idera t ion paid by Tenant to Land lo rd , the r e c e i c : 
and sufficiency of wh ich are h e r e b y acknowledged by Landlord , Land lo rd 
hereby leases and l e t s to Tenant and Tenant hereby rents from Land lo rd uccr . 
and subject to al l of the terms and condit ions set forth here in and in that c e r t a i n 
separa te a g r e e m e n t be tween Landlord and Tenant of even date h e r e w i t h ( the 
"Lease A g r e e m e n t " ) , the p remises at 70th South and 22rd East, Salt Lake C o u n t y , 
Utah, cons i s t ing of the outl ined land area shaded in rec and marked " S k a g g s J 
on the plot p l a n a t t ached here to as Exhib i t "A" and by reference made a o a r : 
hereof, t oge the r wi th all e a s e m e n t s , r igh t s of way and appur t enances in c o n n e c -
tion therewi th o r t he r eun to be long ing and the bui lding (with ou t s ide d i m e n s i o n s 
of 175 feet by 160 feet and a total g r o u n d floor squa re footage of 23,000 ) and 
other i m p r o v e m e n t s cons t ruc ted or to be constructed thereon (all of w h i c h 
are here inaf te r r e f e r r e d to as the " P r e m i s e s " ) , the same being a po r t ion of 
a shopping c e n t e r ( t h e "Shopping Center-") , Lhc presen t buu. idar ics of w h i c h 
are more p a r t i c u l a r l y described on Exhibi t "B" attached hereto and by r e f e r e n c e 
made a p a r t he reo f . In addi t ion , T e n a n t and its invi tees , customers and e m p l o y e e s 
shall have the u s e in common with Land lo rd and other tenants of Land lo rd a n d 
thei r r e s p e c t i v e i n v i t e e s , c u s t o m e r s , and employees of the por t ions of the 
Shopping Cen t e r ( and any en l a rgemen t thereof) not now or hereaf ter o c c u p i e d 
by bu i ld ings for p u r p o s e s of p a r k i n g motor vehic les , loading and u n l o a d i n g . 
ingress and e g r e s s to the Premises and pedes t r ian walkways and s i d e w a l k s 
(all of which a r e h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the "Common A.reas") . No b u i l d i n g 
or other i m p r o v e m e n t s shal l be e rec ted or placed on that port ion of the Common 
Areas which is c rossmatched in g r e e n and marked "Common Area Only" on 
Exhibit "A," n o r sha l l any bu i ld ing or other improvement be erec ted or d a c e d 
in the Shopp ing C e n t e r or any en la rgement thereof which would d e c r e a s e to 
less than the e x i s t i n g p a r k i n g rat io as indicated on Exhibit "A", of s q u a r e 
footage u s e d for v e h i c u l a r p a r k i n g and roadways in the Shopping Center w i t n o u t 
Tenant ' s p r i o r w r i t t e n consent; p r o v i d e d , however , that if the door on the n o r i n -
west s ide of the b u i l d i n g on the P remi se s is permanently closed by T e n a n t , L a n e -
lord shal l h a v e the r igh t to extend the east wmg of the shops located to the w e s t 
of the P r e m i s e s so that the nor th bu i ld ing line thereof is flush with the front of 
the bu i ld ing on the P r e m i s e s . 
(1) TERM. The p re l imina ry term of this Lease sha l l commence 
with the date of th is Leaie ' and ex tend until the date oi the commencement 
of the o r i g i n a l te rm as defined m the art icle of the Lease Agreement en t i t l ed 
"COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." The original term of this Lease 
shall commence upon the exp i ra t ion date of said pre l iminary term a n d s h a : ; 
expire at m i d n i g h t on J a n u a r y 31 following the expirat ion of twen ty - f i ve (2o ) 
years from the commencement of s a id original t e rm. 
If the or ig ina l term of this Lease has not commenced on or 
before Ju ly 1, 1975 by the o c c u r r e n c e of such events as he re inabove r e q u i r e d , 
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Tenant may t e rmina te this Lease and the Lease Agreement by g iv ing w r i t t e n 
notice thereof to Land lo rd . If the o r ig ina l term has not commenced on 
or before F e b r u a r y 1, 1976, this Lease and the Lease Agreement shal l a u t o -
matically t e rmina te without notice un less Tenan t has theretofore occupied 
the P remi se s and opened for bus ines s thereon in which event Tenan t may t e r m i n -
ate this Lease and the Lease Agreement by giving notice thereof to Landlord 
and vacat ing the P r e m i s e s . 
(2) OPTION TO EXTEND. T e n a n t , at its opt ion , may extend 
the term of this Lease for not to exceed four s e p a r a t e and addi t ional c o n s e c u -
tive p e r i o d s of 5 y e a r s each . Each such ex tended term sha l l be on the 
same terms and condi t ions and at the same ren t set forth in this Lease 
and in the Lease Agreemen t . Each such ex tens ion sha l l be e x e r c i s e d by 
giving w r i t t e n not ice to Landlord at l e a s : 180 d a y s p r i o r to the exp i ra t ion 
of the o r i g i n a l term hereof or any such ex tended t e r m . Upon such e x e r c i s e , 
this Lease and the Lease Agreement sha l l be deemed to be ex tended wi thou t 
the execut ion of any fur ther lease or o ther i n s t r u m e n t . 
(3) INTERPRETATION. In the event of any conflict berween the 
terms of this Lease and the Lease Agreemen t , the Lease Agreemen : sha l l p r e v a i l . 
All of the r i g h t s and obligat ions of the p a r t i e s u n d e r this Lease shal l b ind and 
the benef i ts sha l l i n u r e to their r e spec t i ve h e i r s , legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , s u c c e s s o r s 
and a s s igns . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Lease h a s been executed as of the 
day and year f i r s t above w r i t t en . 
HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES , 
a p a r t n e r s h i p 
C" ^hr- '<Tc 
Genera l P a r t n e r 
LANDLORD 
SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC. 
ATTEST-: 
-^ a O^f 
Secre ta ry 
[CQRPQRATE SEAL] 
By ML 
It; 
l/V\^\ 
TENANT 
Jon... W.Wo. H o ^ ' V O * * 
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EXH1BIT "B" 
Here inse r t the legal descr ip t ion of the en t i re Shopp ing Cen te r . 
Begining at the Southeast corner of the intersection of 7000 South and 2300 
East Streets, said point being South 0°14'40" West 33.00 feet and South 89° 
51'30" East 33.00 feet from rhe North quarter corner of Section 27, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
89° 51 '30" East along the South line of 7000 South Street 1085.00 feet to a 
point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Easterly and Southerly 
along the arc of said curve 23.56 feet to a point of tangency on the West line 
of Promenade Drive; thence South 0°08'30" West along said West line 102.52 
{ee\ to a point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Southwesterly 
along the arc of said curve 22.51 feet to a point of a reverse curve to the 
left on the North line of Gnnebar Lane, the radius point of said curve being 
South 3 °5 r30" East 200.00 feet; thence Southwesterly along the arc of said 
curve and North line 124.41 feet; thence North 39°30' West 105.19 feet; 
thence South 39°10' West 243.69 feer; thence South 4 5 0 n , 3 5 " West 720.00 
feet; thence South 66°22'30" West 102.47 feet; thence North 89°45'20" West 
150.00 feet to the East line of 2300 East Street; thence North 0°14'40" East 
along said East line 336.00 feet to the poinr of begining. 
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LEASE 
THIS LEASE is mace and entered into as of the Stn dav c: 
M a y _. 1974, between HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES? a par^ris.— 
ship ("Landlord") , and SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., a Delaware cor— -"&•• -
("Tenant"). ** * 
For and in considerat ion ot the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and 
other good and valuable considerat ion paid by Tenant to Landlord, the receipt 
and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged by Landlord, Landlord 
hereby l eases and lets to Tenant and Tenant hereby rents from Landlord upon 
and subject to all of the terms and conditions set forth herein and in that certa.r. 
separate agreement between Landlord and Tenant of even date herewith (the 
"Lease A g r e e m e n t " ) , the premises at 70th South and 22rd East, Salt Lake County , 
Utah, consis t ing of the outlined land area shaded in TQC and marked "Skaggs*-' 
on the plot p lan attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference made a part 
hereof, together with all e a s e m e n t s , rights of way and appurtenances in c o n n e c -
tion therewith or thereunto be long ing and the building (with outside d imens ions 
of 175 feet by 160 feet and a total ground floor square footage of 23,000 ) and 
other improvements constructed or to be constructed thereon (all of which 
are hereinafter referred to as the "Premises"), the same being a portion of 
a shopping center ( the "Shopping Center"), the present boundaries of which 
are more part i cu lar ly descr ibed on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by re ference 
made a p a r t hereof . In addit ion, Tenant and its invitees , customers and err.plcyees 
shall have the u s e in common with Landlord and other tenants of Landlord a n -
their respect ive i n v i t e e s , c u s t o m e r s , and employees of the portions of the 
Shopping Center (and any enlargement thereof) not now or hereafter occupied 
by bui ldings for p u r p o s e s of parking motor vehicles , loading and unloading, 
ingress and e g r e s s to the Premises and pedestrian walkways and s idewalks 
(all of which are hereinafter re ferred to as the "Common Areas") . No bui ld ing 
or other improvements shall be erected or placed on that portion of the Comrr.cr. 
Areas which i s crosshatched in g r e e n and marked "Common Area Only" on 
Exhibit "A," nor shal l any bui ld ing or other improvement be erected or p laced 
in the Shopping Center or any enlargement thereof which would decrease to 
less than the ex i s t ing parking ratio as indicated on Exhibit "A", of square 
footage used for vehicular parking and roadways in the Shopping Center without 
Tenant's pr ior writ ten consent; p r o v i d e d , however, that if the door on the nor th-
west side of the bui ld ing on the Premises is permanently closed by Tenant, Land-
lord shall have the right to ex tend the east wing of the shops located to the w e s ; 
of the Premises so that the north building line thereof is flush with the front o: 
the building on the P r e m i s e s . 
(1) TERM. The prel iminary term of this Lease shall commence 
with the date of this L'eaW and extend until the date of the commencement 
of the or ig inal term as defined m the article of the Lease Agreement entitled 
"COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." The original term of this Lease 
shall commence upon the expirat ion date of said preliminary term and snai l 
expire at midnight on January 31 following the expiration of tv/enty-five (25) 
years from the commencement of sa id original term. 
If the original term of this Lease has not commenced on or 
before July 1, 1975 by the o c c u r r e n c e of such events as hereinabove r e q u i r e d , 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
EXH1BIT »B" 
Here insert the legal description of the entire Shopping Center. 
Begining at the Southeast corner of the intersection of 7000 South and 2300 
East Streets, said point being South 0ol4'40n West 33.00 feet and South 89° 
5r30" East 33.00 feet from rhe North quarter corner of Section 27, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
89° 51 'SO" East along the South line of 7000 South Street 1085.00 feet to a 
point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Easterly and Southerly 
along the arc of said curve 23.56 feet to a point of tangency on the West line 
of Promenade Drive; thence South 0°08'30M West along said West line 102.52 
feet to a point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Southwesterly 
along the arc of said curve 22.51 feet to a point of a reverse curve to the 
left on the North line of Cinnebar Lane, the radius point of said curve being 
South 3°5r30" East 200.00 feet; thence Southwesterly along the arc of said 
curve and North line 124.41 feet; thence North 39°30* West 105.19 feet; 
thence South G^IO' West 243.69 feet; thence South 45°11,35" West 720.00 
feet; thence South 66o22,30" West 102.47 feet; thence North a W S ' ^ " West 
150.00 feet to the East line of 2300 East Street; thence North 0o14,40" East 
along said East line 336.00 feet to the point of begining. 
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